2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

9-6-2007

Witcher v. Sodexho Inc

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

Recommended Citation
"Witcher v. Sodexho Inc" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 468.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/468

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-2166
________________
GEORGE WITCHER,
Appellant
vs.
SODEXHO, INC.
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00205)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 5, 2007
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: September 6, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
George Witcher, acting pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware granting summary judgment in favor of Sodexho, Inc.,
on claims of age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in
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Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act
(“DDEA”).1
Witcher began working as a delivery driver for Sodexho in April of 2003,
when he was 58 years old. He resigned on June 23, 2005, at the age of 60. Witcher’s
complaint alleges that during this time, Sodexho discriminated against him on the basis of
age and retaliated against him after he complained of this treatment. In support of the
discrimination claims, he points to three incidents: a conversation with his supervisor in
late 2003 in which his age was mentioned as a factor that should have led Witcher to act
more responsibly and to keep co-workers in line; a conversation with other managers in
March of 2004 during which Witcher was asked once whether he was “just too old for the
job” during a discussion of his eyesight and ability to drive the delivery van; and a June
2004 confrontation during which Witcher cursed at another supervisor, was escorted off
the premises by security personnel, and was suspended with pay for one week while
Sodexho conducted an investigation. Witcher identifies as retaliatory four events: the
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The District Court held that Witcher’s state law claims were barred under 19 Del. C.
§ 714(c) because he had elected to seek federal remedies in a federal forum. See
Memorandum Opinion of March 26, 2007 (citing Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consol. Sch.
Dist., 437 F. Supp. 2d 235, 246-47 (D. Del. 2006)). This Court has not directly addressed
the question of whether plaintiffs may bring an action in federal court under both the
ADEA and the DDEA. We need not decide the issue here, however, as appellant’s claims
would fail under the DDEA for the same reasons the ADEA claims do not survive
summary judgment. See 19 Del. C. § 711(a)(1)(“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to . . . discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such
individual’s . . . age.”).
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failure to receive a scheduled raise in June of 2004; being required to work for two days
in September of 2004 while the workplace was under construction and there was danger
of asbestos exposure; receiving a written warning for failing to attend work as scheduled
in February 2005; and a seven week delay in repairing his delivery van. The District
Court found this evidence insufficient to sustain either claim. We agree.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and undertake
plenary review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. See Cardenas v.
Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when there
is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making the
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See
Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 254.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).2 Where, as here,
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To the extent that the complaint in this case can be read to state a claim for hostile
work environment or constructive discharge, these claims fail. Appellant has not
introduced evidence that his “workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of
[his] employment.” Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 054237, 2007 WL 2119769, at *6 (2nd Cir. July 24, 2007)(citations omitted). Nor has he
established that “the conduct complained of would have the foreseeable result that
working conditions would be so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person in the
employee’s shoes would resign.” Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079
(3d Cir. 1992)(citations omitted).
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there is no direct evidence of discrimination, age discrimination claims are analyzed
under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). See Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). In order to meet his
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, appellant must present
evidence that he “(1) was over forty years old at the time of the adverse employment
decision; (2) is qualified for the position in question; (3) suffered from an adverse
employment decision; and (4) that his employer replaced him with someone sufficiently
younger to permit a reasonable inference of age discrimination.” Id. at 184-85 (citing
Potence v. Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004); Anderson v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2002)).
We agree with the District Court that Witcher failed to establish a prima
facie case because he has not shown that he suffered from an adverse employment
decision. Appellant has not suggested that Sodexho fired or demoted him. See Turner v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1990). He has not alleged that his pay
was reduced, he was suspended without pay, or suffered any other reduction in benefits or
change in employment conditions. See Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d
778, 788 (3d Cir. 1998). Rather, Witcher has identified two conversations in which his
age was mentioned in a way that might be interpreted as negative or questioning of his
ability to perform his duties. While appellant may have been upset by these comments or
even driven into depression, as he alleges, these isolated comments are legally insufficient
to constitute an adverse employment action. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
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U.S. 755, 788 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Nor does the
June 2004 incident provide sufficient support for appellant’s claim. Even accepting as
true appellant’s contention that Sodexho’s policies governing language use and
confronting supervisors were unevenly enforced, and even if he could show that he was
singled out because of his age, in the end, the company did not discipline him, suspend
him without pay, or otherwise sanction him. Because Witcher did not introduce
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the District Court
properly granted summary judgment on this claim.
Retaliation claims relying on indirect evidence are also analyzed under
McDonnell Douglas. See Fasold, 409 F.3d at 188-89. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, appellant must show “(1) that s/he engaged in a protected employee activity;
(2) that s/he was subject to adverse action by the employer either subsequent to or
contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) that there is a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. (citing Fogleman v. Mercy
Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 467-68 (3d Cir. 2002)). With regard to the second prong,
plaintiffs are not required to show that the adverse action by the employer was so extreme
as to affect the terms and conditions of employment; however, plaintiffs must still
demonstrate that the alleged retaliatory actions were “materially adverse.” See Moore v.
City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006).
Unlike the District Court, we are not entirely convinced that Witcher failed
to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. He arguably engaged in a protected
5

employee activity by making his claims of age discrimination known to Sodexho on at
least two occasions. He also arguably suffered adverse employment actions in having a
scheduled pay increase delayed for ten months3 and by being forced to work in an unsafe
construction site, while other employees were excused from doing so.4 While there is no
direct evidence connecting these actions to the protected employment activity, temporal
proximity alone will sometimes suffice to satisfy the third prong in the prima facie case.
See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2000).
Assuming arguendo that Witcher established a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden would shift to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory
reason for the adverse employment actions. See Moore, 461 F.3d at 342. Here, Sodexho
has met this burden. It introduced evidence that the delay in implementing the scheduled
pay increase was due to management changeovers. The fact that Witcher received
positive reviews and a timely pay increase in 2005, following further allegations of age
discrimination by Witcher, bolsters appellee’s claim that there was no retaliatory motive
for the delay in 2004. Defendant’s evidence also suggests that Witcher was not, in fact,
required to work in an unsafe area during construction and that other Sodexho employees
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As the District Court noted, the pay increase, once approved, was made retroactive
to the scheduled date. The lengthy delay alone, however, may have constituted a
materially adverse action.
4

We agree with the District Court that neither the allegation that appellant received a
written notice after failing to come to work in February of 2005 nor the contention that
Sodexho did not fix his delivery van promptly rose to the level of a materially adverse
action.
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were also assigned to work at the site during construction.
In the face of the nonretaliatory reasons given by Sodexho, the burden shifts
back to Witcher, who must be able to convince a factfinder that the proffered explanation
was false and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse action. See Moore, 461
F.3d at 342. Here, he has not shown a pattern of severe harassment, direct evidence
suggestive of retaliation, or any other evidence to suggest that the reasons explanations
put forward by Sodexho were pretextual. Contra id. at 346-49. Because appellant failed
to meet his ultimate burden, it was appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of
appellee on the retaliation claims.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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